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LEGISLATION
Estate Tax-Marital Deduction-
Compliance With Revenue Procedure 64-19
In those cases where an executor or trustee is directed by the
governing instrument to satisfy a pecuniary bequest or transfer in
trust by a distribution of the property in kind,' with assets at values
as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, there is the
possibility that the surviving spouse will receive property the fair
market value of which at the time of distribution is less than the
amount of the marital deduction.2 The problem arises when there
is a decline in the fair market value of the property between the
date of valuation for federal estate tax purposes3 and the date of
distribution for purposes of state probate law. In such a case, if the
fiduciary has discretion to divide the property solely according to its
fair market value at the time of valuation, theoretically he can give
the widow property which has become worthless and transfer all
valuable assets to the remaining heirs. Thus, the heirs could receive
disproportionately more and the widow disproportionately less of
the decedents actual estate, resulting in a frustration of the purpose
of Congress in providing for the deduction4 by depriving the govern-
1. In the absence of some provision in the instrument directing the executor to
make a distribution in kind, the weight of authority imposes a duty upon him to
convert such property into cash. In re Lazar's Estate, 139 Misc. 261, 247 N.Y. Supp.
230 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056, provides that the maximum marital deduction
shall be equal to one-half of the adjusted gross estate. Rev. Proc. 64-19 is aimed at
removing the functional problem heretofore present in the pecuniary formula-the
realization of a capital gain by the executor or administrator in the event of an
appreciation in the estate. This functional problem prompted fiduciaries to use the
fractional share formula, but now that the appreciation or depreciation will be
accounted for in distribution to the beneficiaries under Rev. Proc. 64-19, the pecuniary
formula appears to be most appealing. CASNEn, EsTATE PLANNING 84-91 (3d ed. 1961).
3. INT. REv. CODE: or 1954, § 2032, provides for an alternate valuation allowing
the executor to elect between date of death or one year from date of death. In a
period of inflation, date of death would be the likely choice for valuation purposes.
4. The objective of the drafters of § 2056 was to place residents of common law
jurisdictions on an equal basis with residents of community property states. Since
the estate of the deceased husband in a common law jurisdiction was taxed on the
ful amount of his property, while a similar estate in a community property jurisdic-
tion was taxed only on the deceased's one-half interest (the remaining one-half being
taxed in the widow's estate), the resident in a common law jurisdiction was at a
distinct tax disadvantage. For example, a $300,000 estate in a common law jurisdic-
tion was taxed once on the full amount, while the same estate in a community property
state was taxed twice on the amount of $150,000. To eliminate this disadvantage,
Congress provided for a maximum marital deduction equivalent to one-half of the
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ment of a portion of the tax collectible at the widow's death.5
In order to clarify this situation and provide an acceptable inter-
pretation, Revenue Procedure 64-19 was promulgated. 6 In it the
Service takes the position that the deduction will be allowed "where,
by virtue of the duties imposed on the fiduciary either by applicable
state law or by the express or implied provisions of the instrument,
it is clear that the fiduciary... must distribute [the] assets" (1) so
as to spread the appreciation or depreciation proportionately among
the beneficiaries or (2) give the spouse assets the fair market value
of which at date of distribution is as great as the fair market value
at date of valuation.7 If the requirements set forth by the Service
are not met, it follows that the deduction will be disallowed. Recog-
nizing that in many instances the provisions of the instrument or
applicable state law are not clear as to whether the discretion of the
fiduciary was limited in the manner 8 prescribed by the Internal
Revenue Service, the procedure further provides that the deduction
will be allowed under an instrument executed prior to October 1,
1964, if the Internal Revenue Service receives appropriate agree-
ments from the fiduciary and surviving spouse as outlined in the
procedure.9
While it may be argued that Revenue Procedure 64-19 is un-
necessary because upon general principles of equity such action by a
fiduciary would be an abuse of discretion, there is a striking absence
of decisional law on this point.'0 Though such an absence may indi-
adjusted gross estate, de Funiak, A Review In Brief of Principles of Community
Property, 32 Ky. L.J. 63 (1943).
5. The marital deduction rests on the assumption that one-half of the deceased's
property will be taxed in his estate and the remaining one-half in the widow's estate.
If, by exercise of discretion, the fiduciary is able to give the benefit of the marital
deduction to the remaining heirs by giving them the appreciated property, then the
government stands to lose on its tax collections. Though not implicitly stated, the
Service is only concerned when there has been a depreciation of the assets since an
appreciation will not adversely affect the tax revenue. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the
Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HAav. L. Rv. 1097 (1948).
6. Rev. Proc. 64-19, INT. REv. BuLL. No. 15, at 30 (1964);
7. Rev. Proc. 64-19, INT. REv. Bu.. No. 15, at 31 (1964).
8. Ibid.
9. Rev. Proc. 64-19, INT. REv. BULL. No. 15 at 32, 33 (1964), sets forth the standard
form agreements which the fiduciary and surviving spouse must execute with the
Service. The provisions of the forms are substantially the same as the requirements for
a pro rata distribution of assets.
10. In re Stutzer's Estate, 155 Misc. 301, 279 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Surr. Ct. 1935),
would suggest that the duty of uberrima fides might prohibit the fiduciary from
distributing the assets to the detriment of the widow. This case was decided prior to
N.Y. DE CE.NT EsTATE LAW § 125, which made such action by a fiduciary violative
of public policy. Other New York decisions subsequent to this public policy state-
ment are generally an application of the enactment on a case by case basis. In re
Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956); In re James' Estate, 189 Misc.
24, 65 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Surr. Ct. 1946); In re Farley's Estate, 176 Misc. 772, 29
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cate that the principle is so well established that litigation has not
been forthcoming, it is equally possible that the Internal Revenue
Service was correct in recognizing the need for a definitive state-
ment of the fiduciary power such as that set forth in Revenue Pro-
cedure 64-19. While New York has made the exercise of such discre-
tion violative of public policy," it has not specified a method for
implementation. It is likely, however, that the implementation is
implicit in the nature of the probate proceeding so that a general
statement of public policy makes it clear that the state will not
sanction the kind of action on the part of a fiduciary which Revenue
Procedure 64-19 is designed to discourage. The Mississippi legislature
has recently enacted two statutes to satisfy the requirement of the
procedure. 12 The first statute limits the discretion of the fiduciary
but provides that either of the two alternatives outlined by the
Internal Revenue Service may be employed by the fiduciary.'3  The
N.Y.S. 2d 221 (Surr. Ct. 1941). Another indication that such action on the fiduciary's
part might be an abuse of discretion is found in a Pennsylvania case: Hildreth Estate,
30 Pa. D. & C.2d 797 (1963). But this case involved a will construction and was
merely interpreting a will clause rather than stating a general common law principle.
Thus it cannot be doubted that the decisional law in this area is scant and what does
exist is confused by statutory enactments and will clauses. In practice, the widow
may never object because she is frequently the income beneficiary of both the marital
and non-marital deduction part and possesses a power of testamentary disposition over
both. Thus, in the typical case of the close-knit family, the widow may desire to take
the depreciated assets in order to minimize the future tax on her own estate.
11. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 125.
12. Miss. GEN. AcTs 1964, S. No. 2059, § 1. "That whenever under any last will
and testament the executor or other fiduciary is required to, or has an option to,
satisfy a pecuniary bequest to the surviving spouse of the testator, or to a trust for
the benefit of a surviving spouse, by a transfer of assets of the estate in kind at values
determined for federal estate tax purposes, the executor or other fiduciary shall be
required to satisfy such pecuniary bequest by the distribution to the surviving spouse
or trustee of either: (1) assets having an aggregate fair market value, on the dates
of distribution, not less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust
as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, or (2) assets fairly representative
of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all property available for distribution
in satisfaction of the pecuniary bequest or transfer."
Miss. GmN. AcTs 1964, S. No. 2060, § 1. "That the executor, trustee, or other
fiduciary having discretionary powers under a last will and testament or transfer in,
trust shall be authorized to enter into agreements with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue of the United States of America, and other taxing authorities, to exercise the
fiduciary's discretion so that the assets to be distributed in satisfaction of a bequest
or transfer in trust will be selected in such a manner that cash and other properties
distributed will have an aggregate fair market value representative of the pecuniary
legatee's or transferee's proportionate share of the appreciation or depreciation in value
to the date, or dates, of distribution of all property then available for distribution in satis-
faction of such bequest or transfer. It being the purpose of this act to authorize
such fiduciary to enter into any agreement that may be necessary or advisable in
order to secure for Federal estate tax purppses the maximum marital deduction available
under the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States of America and to do and
perform all acts incident to such purpose."
13. Miss. GEN. AcTs 1964, S. No. 2059.
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companion provision is an enabling statute providing that the fidu-
ciary and surviving spouse, under an instrument executed prior to
October 1, 1964, may enter into appropriate agreements with the
Service to assure that the assets will be distributed in the manner
provided by the procedure.14 It has been suggested that the first
statute, by permitting the fiduciary to choose between either of the
alternatives and by failing to specify that one rather than the other
of the alternatives is applicable, may not meet the requirements of
Revenue Procedure 64-19.15 A careful reading of section 2.03 of the
procedure seems to indicate that the Service has imposed no such
selection requirement and that it is unnecessary to specify that one
rather than the other is applicable.16 Thus, any criticism of the
Mississippi statute based on this suggestion seems questionable and
it appears that the statute does satisfy the requirements of Revenue
Procedure 64-19.17 Conflicting interpretations of Revenue Procedure
14. Miss. GEN. AcTs 1964, S. No. 2060.
15. 15 P-H FED. TAX REP. BuLL. f 32,361 (No. 29, July 16, 1964). "It is clear that
[the] requirements of Rev. Proc. 64-19 will be satisfied if the fiduciary must distribute
assets with a date of distribution value equal to the amount of the marital bequest. It
is equally clear that its requirements will also be satisfied if he must distribute assets
fairly representative of the appreciation or depreciation of the estate. What is not clear
is whether the requirements are satisfied if the fiduciary can choose between the two
alternatives. Section 2.03 of Rev. Proc. 64-19 seems to say that it must be clear under
the instrument or state law 'that one rather than the other [of the two alternatives]
is applicable.' If the instrument or state law allows the executor to use either approach,
can it be said that it's clear 'that one rather than the other is applicable'? Until this
question is cleared up by further rulings, it would appear best to give the fiduciary
only one of these alternatives."
16. Rev. Proc. 64-19, INT. REv. BULL. No. 15, at 31 (1964) reads: "In many in-
stances . . . it cannot be determined that he would be required to make distribution
in conformance with one or the other of the above requirements or that one rather than
the other is applicable." The interpretation of this section by Prentice-Hall looks only
to the second portion of the "or proposition," thereby failing to consider it as a whole.
When considered as a whole, this section is essentially saying that when one or the
other of the alternatives is set forth (as illustrated by the Mississippi statute) or
where only one of the alternatives is set forth (and it is not important as to which
one is chosen) then this is sufficient.
17. At present there are no cases or articles discussing the recent Mississippi statute.
While on its face the statute may appear to give the fiduciary absolute discretion to
choose between the alternatives in such a manner as to treat certain beneficiaries in a
manner detrimental to others, generally, state probate law (which is equitable in
nature), would prohibit such discretion. To illustrate: if at date of valuation Chrysler
common stock has a market value per share of $50; the maximum amount of the
marital deduction is $25 ( z of the adjusted gross estate); suppose Chrysler falls to $40
at time of distribution. Under alternative 1, the fiduciary must give the spouse $25,
whereas, under alternative 2 he could give the spouse $20. If Chrysler goes up to
$60, under alternative 1 the fiduciary must give the spouse $25, but under alternative
2 he may give the spouse $30. While probate law may vary from state to state, there
is a duty imposed on the fiduciary to deal impartially with the beneficiaries. Thus,
the probate law would seem to require that alternative which would be commensurate
with the best interests of all the beneficiaries in the particular case. A grant of
authority in the trust instrument which permits the fiduciary to exercise discretion must
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64-19, however, has prompted the drafting of a statute including
only the alternative of a "distribution fairly representative of appre-
ciation or depreciation in the value of all property thus available for
distribution in satisfaction of such pecuniary bequest or transfer."'
The second alternative has been chosen because it promotes equality
among the several beneficiaries and provides for ease in administra-
tion, as all parties share equally in any gains or losses in the estate.
Thus the following model statute is proposed:
Whenever, under the terms of a will or trust, an executor or trustee
is empowered to satisfy a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust to a
decedent's surviving spouse by a transfer in kind of assets of the estate at
values as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, the executor or
trustee shall be required to satisfy such pecuniary bequest by the distri-
butions of assets, including cash, having an aggregate fair market value
at the date, or dates, of distribution fairly representative of appreciation
or depreciation in the value of all property thus available for distribution
in satisfaction of such pecuniary bequest or transfer.
In those states where the legislature has not enacted appropriate
legislation, the estate planner can comply with Revenue Procedure
64-19 by a clause in the instrument itself. After authorizing a distri-
bution in kind in satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest to the widow with
assets at values as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes,
the following clause may be inserted:
The assets to be distributed in satisfaction of this bequest shall be
selected in such manner that the cash and other property distributed will
have an aggregate fair market value fairly representative of the distributee's
proportionate share of the appreciation or depreciation in the value to the
date, or dates, of distribution of all property then available for distribution. 19
Legislation-Good Samaritan Protection
The common law does not legally obligate a stranger to respond
to cries for help from the suffering or to attempt the rescue of anyone
in immediate danger,1 although exceptions to this general rule have
nevertheless be exercised under the fiduciary obligations of fairness and impartiality.
2 Scorr, ThusTs § 183 (2d ed. 1956).
18. Colson, The Marital Deduction and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 10 PRAc. LA w 70
(1964).
19. Suggested by Professor Herman L. Trautman, Vanderbilt University School of
Law.
1. O'Keefe v. William J. Barry Co., 311 Mass. 517, 42 N.E.2d 267 (1942). See
generally, PNossmi, ToRTs § 54 (3d ed. 1964).
1964 ]
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been recognized because of special relationships between the parties
such as master-servant2 or carrier-passenger.3 The reluctance of
courts to impose affirmative duties on the individual has been
attributed to the common law's high regard for personal freedom and
to the view that everyone is able to take care of himself.4 However,
the good samaritan who chooses to abide by his moral obligation to
aid the distressed must exercise reasonable care in his efforts if he
is to avoid civil liability as a consequence of his assumption of a
legal relationship toward his charge.5 Such a volunteer must take
care not negligently to injure the victim or leave him in a worse
condition than he was found.6
A number of state legislatures have recently concluded that fear
of civil liability, and of medical malpractice suits in particular, has
probably deterred those who would otherwise administer emergency
assistance at the scene of an accident-especially physicians7 and
other licensed medical workers. Though these fears have been dis-
counted by several commentators who have stressed the relative
scarcity of reported suits of this nature8 and the reasonableness of
those decisions that have imposed liability on intervenors,9 an increas-
ing public apprehension of the danger of becoming involved in litiga-
tion has prompted the passage of a series of remedial statutes. The
first good samaritan law was enacted by California in 1959, and to
date, twenty-eight states have adopted some variation of this act.10
2. Rival v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 62 N.M. 159, 306 P.2d 648 (1957).
3. Continental So. Lines, Inc. v. Robertson, 241 Miss. 796, 133 So. 2d 543 (1961).
4. Note, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 631, 632 (1952).
5. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); RESATE E (SEcoND),
TORTs § 322 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
6. Lindgren v. Shepard S.S. Co., 108 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
7. "[D]octors, with ample reason, are increasingly afraid to act as Good Samaritans.
In such cases, the threat of a malpractice suit hangs over their heads like a Sword of
Damocles. And malpractice insurance does not necessarily cover 'acts of mercy.'"
Kearney, Why Doctors are "Bad" Samaritans, Reader's Digest, May 1963, pp. 87-88.
8. E.g., United States v. Lawvter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955) (inexperienced
crewman's delay in attempting to raise victim into helicopter caused her to lose her
grip and fall, although more experienced personnel were available).
9. REGAN, DocToR AND PATiENT AND T=m LAW 334 (4th ed. 1962); Averbach,
Good Samaritan Laws, Case & Comment, March-April 1964, pp. 13, 18.
10. ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.365 (1962); AnK. STAT. ANN. § 72-624 (Supp. 1963);
CAL. Bus. & PrtOF. CODE § 2144 (1960) (doctors); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2727.5
(Supp. 1963) (nurses); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-5776 (Supp. 1963); GA. CODE
ANN. § 84-930 (Supp. 1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-1361 (Supp. 1964); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 66, § 9-A (Supp. 1963) (doctors); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 71, §
14 (Supp. 1963) (osteopaths); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149A (Supp. 1984); MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12B (Supp. 1963); McaH. STAT. ANN. § 14.563 (Supp.
1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8893.5 (Supp. 1962); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 17-410
(Supp. 1963); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1152 (Supp. 1963); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.500
(Supp. 1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329.25 (Supp. 1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:62A-1 (Supp. 1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-12-3, 12-12-4 (Supp. 1963); N.D,
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The Tennessee good samaritan law is fairly typical of most of these
statutes:
Any person, including those licensed to practice medicine and surgery
and including any person licensed to render service ancillary thereto,
who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident
and/or disaster, to the victim or victims thereof without making a charge
therefor, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or
omission by such person in rendering the emergency care or as a result
of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treat-
ment or care for the injured person, except such damages as may result
from the gross negligence to the person rendering such emergency care.11
The most significant feature of this law is the more limited standard
of care required of intervenors, whether they be physicians or lay-
men, 2 as compared to the common law's familiar rule requiring the
degree of care expected of a reasonable man under the same or
similar emergency circumstances. Because it has apparently excused'
all conduct short of gross negligence, so long as the volunteer acts
in good faith, the legislature must have felt that the good samaritan
had been held to an unreasonably high standard of performance by
the common law rule, even though the reasonableness of his acts
was measured by the circumstances of the emergency. Nevertheless,
if this change from the usual standard of negligence is interpreted
as imposing only a minimal standard of care, the statute should offer
protection, and therefore encouragement, to hesitant rescuers with-
out resorting to the extreme measure of punishing failure to take
affirmative action to aid imperiled strangers. Although encourage-
ment of some type of affirmative action by all passers-by is an
admirable goal, it is questionable whether the first aid services
rendered by laymen who would not otherwise attempt treatment of
serious injuries would not aggravate the original injury in more cases
than they would improve the injured person's condition. Accordingly,
the wisdom of a marked departure from the time-honored rule of
CENT. CODE §§ 43-17-37, 43-17-38 (Supp. 1963); Omo BEv. CODE ANN. § 2305.23
(Supp. 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 5 (Supp. 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 1641, 1642 (Supp. 1963); S.D. SEss. LAws 1961, ch. 137, No. 509; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 63-622 (Supp. 1964); TEx. Rt v. Civ. STAT. art. la (Supp. 1964); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 58-12-23 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-276.9 (Supp. 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
147.17(7) (Supp. 1964) (doctors); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 149.06(5) (Supp. 1964)
(nurses); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-343.1 (Supp. 1963).
For an excellent analysis and criticism of these laws see Note, 42 ORE. L. REv. 328
(1963).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-622 (Supp. 1964).
12. The statutes of Arkansas, Georgia, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming offer protection to anyone who renders aid at the
scene of an emergency. The remaining nineteen states have restricted immunity from
civil liability to licensed medical practitioners and registered nurses.
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due care on the part of laymen seems doubtful, especially when it is
considered that the primary motivating factor for the recent surge
of good samaritan legislation apparently has been to relieve medi-
cally trained volunteers from the threat of medical malpractice suits.13
The Tennessee law does not alter the liability of doctors who
expect to be paid for their services,'14 but it seems improbable that
this factor is foremost in the minds of those confronted with the
sudden spectacle of persons too seriously injured to seek out medical
assistance in the conventional manner. Notwithstanding a presump-
tion of expectation of payment, the good samaritan physician can
avail himself of the statute's protection against acts negligently per-
formed during an emergency by seeking remuneration at such time
as he becomes satisfied that liability will not result as a consequence
of his assistance. Regardless of the statute's literal applicability to
gratuitous service cases only, this procedure by the physician seems
justified when balanced against the positive benefits to be derived
from intervention by competent volunteers who, but for the statute,
would decline to offer their services to strangers, thereby depriving
them of what could be their best chance for survival.
Unlike most of the statutes of sister states, the Tennessee law is
not subject to the criticism that it embraces only acts performed at
the scene of an emergency or disaster, for it also protects the rescuer
from adverse consequences of his subsequent "act or failure to act
to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the
injured person."15 This provision apparently includes care that is
rendered enroute to a hospital, but could also afford protection to an
intervenor who abandons his charge before his task is fulfilled. In
any case the statute's imposition of liability for gross negligence
would seem to afford a remedy for abandonment, at least in gross
disregard of obvious consequences.
Although the Tennessee statute offers several refinements not
found in earlier good samaritan laws, it is still subject to the basic
criticism that this remedy is not warranted in the first instance. If
the problem of witnesses indifferent to human suffering at scenes of
emergencies is sufficient to merit legislative attention, it is submitted
that the public could be reassured that their acts would be judged
from a favorable perspective by something less than the complete
13. "[T]his [California] law has been heartily endorsed by the American College
of Surgeons, the American Association for the Surgery of Trauma, and the National
Safety Council. These three organizations have worked together in a joint action
program to foster such legislation elsewhere." Kearney, supra note 7, at 89.
14. The rendering of emergency care creates the presumption that the doctor
expects to be paid, even in the absence of an express contract. RESTATEMENT, Rt snru-
ION § 116 (1937).
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-622 (Supp. 1964).
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abandonment of the traditional common law test for negligence.
Such a statutory provision could require that in all cases of volun-
tary assistance in emergency situations the judge must call to the
attention of the jury the fact that the intervenor acted voluntarily
and gratuitously, and that his acts were performed under emer-
gency conditions. While such a charge in jury cases would not
essentially change the common law standard, it is submitted that this
form of legislative action would insure its application in every state
court and, more important, would publicly declare legislative aware-
ness that circumstances of an emergency must be considered in deter-
mining the reasonableness of actions taken in response to that
emergency.
An incorporation of the present Tennessee good samaritan law's
provisions into a legislative declaration of the common law rule
could take the following form:
PROPOSED STATUTE
In all civil cases in which any person, including those licensed to prac-
tice medicine and surgery in any state of the United States and includ-
ing any person licensed to render service ancillary thereto in any state
of the United States, renders emergency care at the scene of an accident
or disaster to the victim or victims thereof, when he has no legal
obligation to act, or who acts or fails to act to provide or arrange for
further medical treatment or care for the injured person, without making
a charge therefor, the judge as trier of fact in non-jury trials, or the
jury, upon the judge's instructions, shall take into consideration the
fact that such acts or omissions were gratuitously and voluntarily
performed under emergency conditions, and that liability is not to be
imposed if the trier of fact finds that such person acted with the due
care and diligence of a reasonable man under the same or similar
emergency conditions.
Tort-Comparative Negligence Statute
In the opinion of many, the doctrine of contributory negligence'
is an unjust and outmoded concept. In its stead it has been suggested
that a system of comparative negligence be established, whereby
damages are apportioned according to the fault of the parties in-
volved.
1. The doctrine had its origin in the case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60,
103 Eng. Rep. .926 (1809), where it was said that one man's negligence does not
preclude the necessity of another's taking ordinary precautions to safeguard himself.
By 1854 courts in the-United States were citing the doctrine as a fixed rule of law.
Pennsylvania R.R. v, Aspell, 23 Pa. 147 (1854).
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I. OBJECTIONS TO THE DoaruNE OF CONTRIBUTonY NEGLIGENCE
Critics of the doctrine of contributory negligence contend that the
conditions surrounding its birth and growth are no longer present,
and hence its reasons for existence no longer valid. The doctrine
developed during the industrial revolution when it was necessary
to restrict the liabilities of rapidly growing industry.2 This need was
particularly acute since there was no liability insurance and no
provision for spreading industrial risks.3 The courts utilized the
doctrine to control and sometimes even eliminate the jury, which
often seemed unable to deal fairly with a corporate defendant.
4
Critics maintain that economic, industrial, and social changes have
taken place in our society which not only make the doctrine un-
necessary, but indeed make it unjust. Today workmen's compen-
sation and liability insurance take care of most employer-employee
problems, and the really large and difficult area of negligence litiga-
tion involves automobile accidents. Here, use of the doctrine can only
cause injustice.
The main objection to the doctrine of contributory negligence is
that, when plaintiff and defendant are both proximately negligent,
it is unjust to place the whole loss on either one of them alone.-
Under a system of comparative negligence, each party would be
liable only for that portion of the damages for which he was responsi-
ble, and no injured plaintiff would go uncompensated simply because
in some small way he had contributed to the cause of his damages.
In a large number of negligence cases where there may be con-
tributory negligence, juries will often disregard their instructions and
2. Eldredge, Contributory Negligence: An Outmoded Defense that Should be
Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52 (1957); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Micu. L. REv.
465,468 (1953).
3. This doctrine "plus two other rules, i.e., the fellow-servant doctrine and voluntary
assumption of risk, greatly limited the tort liability of manufacturers and other
employers to injured employees. The liability of manufacturers and contractors to
third persons was restricted by the rule that there was no tort liability in the absence
of privity of contract." Eldredge, supra note 2, at 52.
4. Malone points out that when simple disputes between neighbors had formed
the bulk of tort litigation, juries had had no trouble disposing of them in a just and
proper manner. However, when large and remote corporate defendants began to
appear, the average juror, often regarding such corporations as intruders as well as very
rich, became much more plaintiff-minded. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory
Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151, 157 (1946). See also Gair, The Contributory Negli-
gence Rule: An Offense to Justice, 35 N.Y.S.B.J. 392, 395 (1963).
5. "The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon the obvious
injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the fault of two parties on one
of them alone, and that one the injured plaintiff, least able to bear it, and quite
possibly much less at fault than the defendant who goes scot-free. No one has ever
succeeded in justifying that as a policy, and no one ever will." Prosser, supra note 2,
at 469. See also Atten, Should Illinois Adopt a Comparative Negligence Statute?
Yes!, 51 ILL. B.J. 194, 196 (1962).
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either return a compromise verdict or disregard the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence altogether.6 It can truthfully be said that juries
have their own system of comparative negligence. Critics of con-
tributory negligence readily concede that such ad hoc apportionment
of damages by juries does at times go on. However, they point out
that when a jury makes such an unauthorized apportionment of
damages in the face of the court's instructions, the result can only be
loss of respect for the law and injustice for other plaintiffs who do not
receive like treatment in similar cases. 7 It is further asserted that
"approval of the covert violation of the present rule, in the interests
of justice, suggests that perhaps the rule should be changed to con-
form to the practice.""
II. BENEFITS OF A ComPARATVE NEGLIGENCE SYSTEM
Proponents of comparative negligence contend that its adoption
would do more than eliminate the injustice of contributory negli-
gence; it would go far toward alleviating the long delays between
injury and trial.9 The long delays are, to a large extent, a direct
product of the court congestion resulting from the large volume of
negligence litigation, especially that involving automobile accidents.
It is contended that the possibility of convincing a jury of the existence
6. Harkavy, Comparative Negligence: The Reflections of a Skeptic, 43 A.B.A.J.
1115, 1116 (1957); Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the Ameri-
can Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005, 1006 (1957).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a rare display of court candor on this topic,
recognized the prevalence of such compromise verdicts in Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa.
227, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955).
7. 1 VH.L. L. REv. 115, 121 (1956); Eldredge, supra note 2, at 54; Prosser, supra note
2, at 469. "It should not be left to the caprice of jury make-up whether justice is
done between parties in comparison with their behavior." Gair, supra note 4, at 398.
8. Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for Our Congested Courts,
19 ALBANY L. Rmv. 4, 11 (1955).
Proponents of the contributory negligence doctrine point out other qualifications, of
the doctrine which have been made by the courts. First, the plaintiff's negligence will
not prohibit recovery if his conduct is not the proximate cause of his injury. Nor will
contributory negligence bar recovery when the defendant's conduct is "wilful, wanton,
or reckless." The same is true in some jurisdictions when the defendant has violated
a statute. Furthermore, the doctrine of last clear chance is available in most states.
Critics, however, reply that such qualifications merely have the effect of shifting the
entire burden of loss to the defendant, an arrangement which, when both parties are
negligent, is no less unjust than placing the burden entirely on the plaintiff. See
Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cm.-KENT L. RE v. 189, 304, (1950).
9. There is much truth to the statement that justice delayed may be the equivalent
of justice denied. "A person whose rights are violated should have the aid of a court in
securing redress. If he is compelled to forego that aid, merely because it was obviously
not going to be available in time to do much good, he may legitimately complain
that the courts have failed. The failure becomes egregious when the injured party is
compelled to settle his claims on unjust terms." Averbach, supra note 8, at 5.
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of contributory negligence is one of the greatest obstacles to settle-
ment of these negligence actions. Hence, elimination of the doctrine
of contributory negligence would facilitate such settlements and sub-
stantially reduce court congestion.10 A second factor compounding
the problem of court congestion in some locales is the heavy reliance
on a relatively small number of trial specialists to try practically all
negligence actions. In these areas court calendars must be accommo-
dated to meet the schedules of such counsel, and further delay is the
inevitable result. It has been maintained that under a system of
comparative negligence, trials of negligence actions would be less
complex, and such specialists would no longer be required," thus
eliminating many delays.
III. PEESENT ExmPLEs OF ComrARATivE NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS
Comparative negligence is not an untried theory. It has supplanted
the doctrine of contributory negligence in Great Britain, 2 Canada, 13
and also on the continent.' 4 In fact, the United States stands almost
alone in not having abolished the old doctrine of Butterfield v.
Forrester.5 Even in the United States, however, acceptance of com-
parative negligence has been more widespread than is often realized.
In 1908, the Federal Employers' Liability Act 16 inaugurated com-
parative negligence on a nationwide scale. It called for the apportion-
ment of damages in all negligence actions for injuries to railroad
employees engaged in interstate commerce. Subsequently, numerous
states passed similar statutes which applied to limited situations both
in and beyond the labor field.' 7 The idea of apportionment was also
incorporated in 1920 into the Merchant Marine Act applicable to
injuries to maritime employees.'8 All of the above statutes applied
only in limited circumstances, and to limited parties. However, seven
states now apply some form of apportionment to negligence cases
generally. Their systems of comparative negligence have taken sev-
eral forms.' 9
A unique common law system of apportionment, 20 known as the
10. Id. at 8. But see text at note 59 infra.
11. Atten, supra note 5, at 197; see also Averbach, supra note 8, at 12, 17.
12. Law Reform Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. VI, c. 28.
13. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 467 n.9.
14. See Turk, supra note 8, at 2.38-44, for a good review of the European history.
15. Supra note 1.
16. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
17. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 478-80.
18. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
19. See text accompanying notes 20-27 infra & notes 30, 33, 39 infra.
20. Illinois and Kansas at one time had a form of common law comparative negli-
gence which involved the comparison of degrees of negligence, but the courts later
repudiated it. Turk, supra-note8, at 305, 317.
[ VOL. 18
LEGISLATION
doctrine of remote contributory negligence, has evolved in Ten-
nessee.21 Under this doctrine an apportionment is made in only one
very limited situation: when the plaintiff's negligence is found to
have contributed only remotely to his injury. 22 Thus the old doctrine
of contributory negligence is still given full effect-negligence on the
part of a plaintiff which is a proximate cause of his injury will bar
any recovery. It must be noted that the jury is given broad discretion
in determining whether there was contribfitory negligence, and if so
whether it was remote or proximate. However, proponents of com-
parative negligence see the Tennessee approach as at best an in-
complete solution for the alleged injustices wrought by contributory
negligence.
The Georgia system is also largely a creature of the common
law, though it is based on two statutes.23 The first of these,2 though
seeming to allow apportionment only in cases of injuries arising
out of railroading, has been broadly interpreted to apply to all
negligence actions, whether involving personal or property damage.25
As thus interpreted, this statute would establish a comprehensive
system of comparative negligence.2 6 However, the second statute, 7
which asserts the principle that the plaintiff's failure to use his last
clear chance to avoid harm should serve to defeat his recovery, has
also come to be generally applied in all negligence actions, and
serves to limit the number of cases in which an apportionment will
be allowed. This imposition of the last clear chance doctrine upon
Georgia's system of apportionment 28 draws criticism from those who
21. Writers trace the doctrine either from Nashville & Chattanooga R.R. v. Carroll,
53 Tenn. 347 (1871), or Whfrley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610 (1858). See 22 TENN.
L. REv. 1030, 1035 (1953).
22. 22 TENN. L. REv. 1030 (1953). Under the common law of most states remote
negligence on the plaintiff's part is not contributory negligence and has no effect on his
recovery.
23. "No person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to himself
or his property, where the same is done by his consent or is caused by his own
negligence. If the complainant and the agents of the company are both at fault, the
former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to
the amount of fault attributable to him." GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1936).
"If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to himself
caused by the defendant's negligence, he is not entitled to recover. In other cases the
defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have contributed
to the injury sustained." GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1936).
24. GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1936).
25. The Georgia courts have also construed § 94-703 to mean that apportionment. will
be allowed only if plaintiff's negligence is less than that of the defendant.
26. See for example, Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668, 16 S.E.2d 214 (1941);
Lamon v. Perry, 33 Ga. App. 248, 125 S.E. 907 (1924).
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1936).-
28. Georgia is the only comparative negligence state which has a statute dealing
with last clear chance in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant;
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favor comparative negligence, for in the end the result is often the
same as if the defense of contributory negligence remained.29 Further-
more, a by-product of this complicated doctrine is jury confusion
and numerous appeals.
Aside from the above apportionment systems, each of which is
something of a hybrid product of the common law, there are several
types of comparative negligence statutes which have been enacted
in the United States. One form of comparative negligence statute
recognizes degrees of negligence.30 Under this type a plaintiff's neg-
ligence reduces his recovery if such negligence was "slight" and that
of the defendant was "gross" in comparison. The courts of Nebraska
and South Dakota-the only two states with such a statute in force-
have refused to define the terms "slight" and "gross" with any
degree of precision. Moreover, they have construed the statutes to
mean that if the negligence of the plaintiff is more than "slight," or
that of the defendant less than "gross," no apportionment will be
made, and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff will bar his
recovery in spite of the fact that his negligence was less than that
of the defendant. This construction has led to jury confusion and a
large number of appeals. A majority of these appeals have resulted
in no apportionment being allowed.31 Even proponents of compara-
tive negligence criticize the use of degrees of negligence because
it has resulted in apportionment in such a small number of cases.32
A second type of comparative negligence statute is that which
allows apportionment on the basis of fault so long as plaintiff's
contributory negligence is less than that of the defendant.33 If plain-
29. ProsSEm, TonTs § 65, at 439 (3d ed. 1964).
30. NEaB. Ev. STAT. § 25-1151 (1943): "In all actions brought to recover damages
to a person or to his property caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the
plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery
when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the
defendant was gross in comparison but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount
of the contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff .... ".S.D. CoDr §
47.0304-1 (Supp. 1952), is identical.
31. For example, a plaintiff has been found guilty of more than "slight" negligence
for failure to drive at a reasonable speed, Anderson v. Altschuler, 125 Neb. 853, 252
N.W. 310 (1934), or for driving at such a speed that he could not stop within his
range of vision, Dickenson v. County of Cheyenne, 146 Neb. 36, 18 N.W.2d 559
(1945). See Prosser, supra note 2, at 488.
32. Id. at 487.
33. "Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person
or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in
injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence
of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any darhages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1957).
"In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in personal injuries or
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tiff's negligence is greater than that of the defendant it will bar any
recovery. Statutes of this type are in force in Wisconsin34 and
Arkansas. 35 Here again, the critics say that apportionment is not
made in all cases where it should be.6 Moreover, it seems illogical
to allow a plaintiff to recover fifty-one per cent of his damages if he
is found to be forty-nine per cent negligent, but nothing if he is
fifty per cent negligent. Dean Prosser suggests that such a rule is
the result of pure political compromise.37 The 'lesser" negligence
rule also has the practical result of causing a great number of appeals
where the court is asked to ascertain whether the conduct of the
plaintiff was "fault" at least equal to that of the defendant.38
The "pure" comparative negligence statute 39 is the ideal of most
proponents of apportionment. Under such a "pure" statute there will
in every case be an apportionment of damages according to fault,
regardless of the fact that plaintiff may have been guilty of a greater
quantum of negligence than the defendant.40 In the United States,
only Mississippi has such a "pure" statute applicable to negligence
actions generally.41
wrongful death or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not prevent a
recovery where any negligence of the person so injured, damaged, or killed is of
less degree than any negligence of the person, firm, or corporation causing such
damage; provided that where such contributory negligence is shown on the part of
the person injured, damaged, or killed, the amount of the recovery shall be diminished
in proportion to such contributory negligence. AR. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.2 (Supp.
1961).
34. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1957).
35. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.2 (Supp. 1961). Arkansas's first comparative
negligence statute, passed in 1955, had no such limitation. Ark. Acts 1955, No. 191,
§ 1. It was a "pure" statute similar to the one in Mississippi, Miss. CODE Am. § 1454
(1942). That 1955 statute was superseded in 1957 by the present one.
36. Knoeler, Review of the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Act-Suggested
Amendment, 41 MAIIQ. L. REv. 397, 415 (1958).
37. Prosser, supra note 2, at 494.
38. Id. at 491.
39. "In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where such injuries
have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact that the person injured, or
the owner of the property, or person having control over the property may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person injured, or the owner of the property, or the person having control over the
property." Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942).
40. Of course, the defendant can also recover a portion of his damages, for the
statute cannot be construed to defeat a counterclaim. Note, 30 N.D.L. REv. 105,
114 (1954).
41. The FELA is also a "pure" act, but of course it applies only where plaintiff and
defendant occupy an employer-employee relationship.
In practice the Mississippi system has the disadvantage of requiring a defendant to
specifically request the court for an instruction to the jury that they should take the
negligence of the plaintiff into consideration in arriving at a verdict. Defense counsel
are often reluctant to make such specific requests, which may seem to a jury to imply
an admission of guilt on the defendant's part. Powell, supra note 6, at 1062 (1957).
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A statutory provision which may be used in conjunction with any
form of comparative negligence statute is one calling for the use of
special verdicts or interrogatories, rather than the general verdict.
Of the states with some system of comparative negligence, only
Wisconsin makes use of special verdicts.42  Use of such special
verdicts provides a check on the jury; it allows at least a limited
review as to whether the court's instructions have been followed.43
IV. EVALUATION OF VAIuous ComruA=IvE NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS
From the experiences of these various states under their compara-
tive negligence statutes, certain observations can be made. For one
thing, the use of degrees of negligence should be avoided. 44 A
system such as that of Nebraska 45 and South Dakota,46 which allows
apportionment only where plaintiff's negligence was "slight" and
defendant's "gross," serves only to cause jury confusion and a large
number of appeals. Moreover, the use of such degrees leaves the
damages undivided in most cases. It is a closer question as to
whether a statute should be completely "pure," that is, whether it
should allow a plaintiff to make an apportioned recovery where he
has been guilty of a greater quantum of negligence than the de-
fendant. However, the "pure," or comprehensive, statute seems
preferable. Besides providing consistency and cutting the number of
appeals, a "pure" statute may eliminate a source of injustice possible
under a limited or "impure" statute. A jury with a very sympa-
thetic plaintiff before it must often feel the temptation to find
contributory negligence to be less than fifty per cent in order that
such plaintiff might recover. There should be fewer such tempta-
tions under a "pure" statute, where even a ninety-nine per cent
negligent plaintiff may be allowed a "recovery" of a portion of his
damages.47
Certain of the old common law defenses should be abolished in
a state which has a system of comparative negligence. The doctrine
of "gross" negligence, under which contributory negligence will not
42. Wis. CODE ANN. § 270.27 (1957), requires the use of special verdicts when so
requested by either party. Under the 1955 comparative negligence law of Arkansas,
supra note 34, special verdicts were mandatory. The 1957 law dispensed with special
verdicts however..
43. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 497, for an example of typical questions to bo
submitted to the jury.
44. Prosser, supra note 2, at 508.
45. Supra note 30.
46. Ibid.
47. Of course such "recovery" will be deducted from defendant's recovery on a
crossclaim. However, under the use of a system of special verdicts, the jury will
probably not have to actually make this deduction.
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prevent a full and unapportioned recovery by the plaintiff wherever
the defendant's negligence may be characterized as "gross,"48 should be
eliminated. Conduct previously characterized as "gross" negligence
should be subject to comparison just as is ordinary negligence.49
Similarly the doctrine of last clear chance should be abolished.50
This rule arose out of a desire to ease the hardship of a plaintiff
under the contributory negligence doctrine. In a state with compara-
tive negligence, the retention of the rule tends to shift the balance
too much in favor of the plaintiff, allowing the injustice of non-appor-
tionment to fall upon the defendant in cases where there has in
fact been proximate contributory negligence on the plaintiffs part.
Likewise the doctrine of assumption of risk might well be dispensed
with as a complete defense.51 Although in theory assumption of the
risk of an undertaking seems quite easily distinguishable from con-
tributory negligence, in practice it is quite often almost impossible
to distinguish "venturousness" from "carelessness." 52 Juries are par-
ticularly hard pressed to make such hairline distinctions. It would
seem wise therefore to allow a jury to regard "venturousness" on the
part of a plaintiff as a form of carelessness or negligence which a
jury could compare with that of the defendant. The abolition of
all three of these doctrines as complete defenses would seem most
consistent with the main purpose of comparative negligence: the
apportionment of loss among guilty parties in as nearly true a
proportion to their fault as possible. Their elimination would also
have the salutary effect of simplifying jury instructions, eliminating
jury confusion, and reducing the number of appeals.
Finally, and perhaps most important, some form of special verdicts
or special interrogatories 0 should be used in connection with a system
of comparative negligence.54 Special verdicts and interrogatories are
48. "Gross" usually designates conduct which is willful, wanton, or reckless.
49. Wisconsin abolished the doctrine of gross negligence in 1962. Bielski v. Schulze,
16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
50. Prosser, supra note 2, at 496. But see, Shell and Bufkin, Comparative Negli-
gence in Mississippi, 27 Miss. L.J. 105, 111 (1956).
51. Wisconsin abolished the assumption of risk doctrine in 1962. McConville v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
52. See Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947).
53. Where a special verdict is used, no general verdict is returned; the jury merely
returns answers to specific questions on the issues. Where special interrogatories are
used, there is a regular instruction to the jury and a general verdict is returned;
In addition, however, the jury also answers questions submitted along with their
instructions. These answers serve as a check upon the jury's conclusions.
54. Lipscomb, Comparative Negligence, 1951 INs. L.J. 667, 673 (1951); Atten,
supra note 5, at 202.'
Some states still hold that all controverted facts not found specifically must be
taken to be found against the. paty. having the burden of proof. In such states special
verdicts become unwieldy and unworkable, and special interrogatories will serve better.
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-designed to reveal failures to follow the court's instructions. Under
the cloak of secrecy, which a general verdict provides, a jury is
often free to completely disregard their instructions. Elimination of
the general verdict will not absolutely insure jury conformity to
instructions, 55 but, at least the court knows whether the jury has
found contributory negligence at all, and if so, in what proportions.
Perhaps just as important is the fact that, under such a system, a jury
is at least forced to give detailed consideration to the precise legal
and factual issues presented.6 Finally, the use of special verdicts will
often eliminate the need for long and complicated instructions, which
are themselves a fertile source of error and appeals.57
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
It is suggested that the utilization of the above recommendations
will help insure a successful comparative negligence system. There
are, however, certain problem areas under comparative negligence for
which no simple solutions can be given. First, there is evidence that
insurance rates increase substantially in states which have a compara-
tive negligence system.58 Second, court congestion may actually in-
crease under a system of comparative negligence, since lawyers may be
willing under an apportionment statute-especially a "pure" one-
to accept cases they would not have bothered with before.59 Finally,
no adequate solution to the problem of how to handle apportion-
ment in multiple party situations has been advanced. 60 The prob-
lem is particularly acute in regard to contribution between joint
tort-feasors. It is not equitable or consistent with the principle of
comparative negligence not to allow contribution. Neither would
it be equitable to allow equal contribution. However, even such an
authority as Dean Prosser recommends leaving multiple party appor-
However, other states bold that facts not found specifically must be deemed to support
the judgment if there was any evidence to sustain it. In these states special verdicts
are probably preferable since they eliminate the need for instructions, which might be
long and complicated. See note 57 infra and accompanying text. See also Fn. R.
Crv. P. 49(a).
55. In fact, with juries being compelled to agree on percentages of negligence for
plaintiff and defendant, quotient verdicts may well multiply.
56. Juries which might be tempted to return verdicts in favor of small children
or pretty girls and against large corporations, may hesitate to return special findings
which they know to be against the evidence.
57. Prosser, supra note 2, at 502. Special interrogatories do not have this advantage,
since they are submitted along with regular instructions. See note 53 supra.
58. Supra note 40, at 117.
59. See Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After"
Survey, 13 ARx. L. REv. 89, 98 (1959).
60. Prosser, supra note 2; Burns, Comparative Negligence: A Law Professor Dissents,
51 ILL. BJ. 708 (1963).
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tionment "theoretically perfect as it may be, to the Canadians until
the American jury is eliminated or at least improved, for the reason
that the game is not worth the candle."6'
Here it is only our purpose to recommend what might be a work-
able comparative negligence system, it being beyond the scope of
this paper to debate and determine the ultimate issue of whether
such a system should be adopted.62 Despite the problems which arise
under even the best apportionment system,63 it is submitted that a
pure comparative negligence statute, coupled with the abolition of
certain common law complete defensesc  and the use of special
verdicts, has much to recommend its adoption.
Voting Rights-Residence Requirements for Voting
in Presidential Elections
In the 1960 presidential election, between five and eight million
American citizens, otherwise qualified to vote, were disenfranchised
by virtue of their having changed place of residence during the year
preceding the election.' At the present time, state residence require-
ments vary widely.2 The most popular requirements are one year
in the state, three months in the county, and thirty days in the
locality.3 The justification for these requirements is that they tend
to prevent fraud, give the citizens sufficient time to acquaint them-
selves with the local candidates and issues, and allow them to become
cognizant of their stake in community affairs.4 These considerations
may be applicable to local elections, but the prevention of fraud is
the only one applicable to presidential elections, and it would seem
that an efficient registration system would greatly reduce this prob-
61. Prosser, supra note 2, at 508. Contra, Knoeller, supra note 36, at 416.
62. For arguments against adopting such a system see Body, Comparative Negligence:
The Views of a Trial Lawyer, 44 A.B.A.J. 346 (1958); Bums, supra note 60; Harkavy,
supra note 6; Powell, supra note 6. In favor of such a system see Atten, supra note 5;
Bress, Comparative Negligence: Let Us Hearken to the Call of Progress, 43 A.B.A.J.
127 (1957); Eldredge, supra note 2; Gair, supra note 4; Prosser, supra note 2.
63. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
1. Scammon, The Electoral Process, 27 LAw & CONTEmT. PROB. 299, 304 (1962).
2. CouNct. oF STATE GOvmuRmENTs, Boox OF Tm STATES 18 (1964-65).
3. Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
ments on Nomination and Election of President and Vice President and Qualifications
for Voting, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 846 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
4. Id. at 850.
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lem. The victims of these outmoded residence requirements include
many citizens who are best equipped to exercise the right of voting,
such as educators, clergymen, and professional people. "Apart from
the possible effects upon election results ... [these archaic residence
requirements] produce apathy and bitterness in such people toward
governments which cheat them of their democratic birthright merely
because they move their residence."5
There have been encouraging trends to liberalize residence re-
quirements in recent years. Some states have reduced their county
or precinct residence requirements, 6 while others have reduced the
restrictions on intrastate movement.7  However, the remedy which
seems to be winning the greatest acceptance is that of enacting spe-
cial legislation to safeguard the right of those who have moved from
one state to another 8 to vote in presidential elections. The first
step in this direction was taken in 1953 when Connecticut adopted
a statute which extended absentee voting to a person who left Con-
necticut to take up residence in another state. This statute permits
such a person to cast an absentee ballot in Connecticut for President
and Vice-President for a period of twenty-four months, unless he has
met the voting residence requirements in the new state.9 In 1954,
Wisconsin adopted a method which is the reverse of the Connecticut
approach. 10 This method permits a new resident of Wisconsin having
less than one year of legal residence to vote for President and Vice-
President if he was a qualified voter in the state of prior residence
or if he would have been eligible had he remained there until the
election date." Each of these approaches has merit,'2 but if some
5. S. REP. No. 80, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1963).
6. Alabama, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
7. California, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Tennessee.
8. Coucr. OF STATE GovERNmENTs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 16. At the present
time 21 states have enacted some type of special legislation to protect the right of
our mobile-citizens to vote in presidential elections.
9. CoNtr. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 9-158 to -163 (1958). (For the purposes of this
article, whenever the Connecticut approach is mentioned, it refers to this statutory
plan). Similar statutes were also adopted in Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
Mass. Acts 1961, ch. 582, §§ 1-2, at 490 (repealed); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 67
(1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 9.047 (Supp. 1963). In 1963, Connecticut enacted
legislation which permits new residents to vote in Connecticut in presidential elections.
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 9-163a to -163j (1964). This legislation does not affect the
provisions which permit persons who have moved from Connecticut to vote in presi-
dential elections by absentee ballot.
10. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.045 to -.046 (1961).
11. The Wisconsin plan, which has found wider acceptance than the Connecticut
plan, has been adopted in Arizona, California, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, and
Oregon. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 1-1h; CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 750-65 (54 days);
MAss. GEN. LA-ws ANN. ch. 51 §§ 1A-1B (Supp. 1962) (repealing 1961 Connecticut
type statute); Mo. CoNST. art. VIII, § 2, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 111.063 to -.067 (1959)
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states followed the Connecticut approach while other states followed
the Wisconsin approach the situation could arise in which many citi-
zens who changed their residence would still be unable to vote. For
example, the Connecticut approach takes care of former residents
who move out of the state, but it has no provision to grant voting
rights to new residents. On the other hand, the Wisconsin approach
takes care of new residents but has no provision to help former resi-
dents. Recognizing the need for a uniform approach to the problem,
the Council of State Governments in 1955 recommended the adoption
of a statute following the Connecticut plan;13 however, it now
appears that they are supporting either approach.14
In 1961 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws directed its attention to the problem and at its annual
meeting in 1962 promulgated the Uniform Act for Voting by New
Residents in Presidential Elections'5 which, in general, follows the
Wisconsin approach.' 6 The Uniform Act waives the requirement for
an extended period of residence so that the new residents will be
(60 days); Oro REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3504.01 to -.07 (1960) (40 days); ORE. CONST.
art. II, § 2; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 247.410 to .47 (1961) (30 days).
12. See Hearings'31-38.
13. CoUNCIL OF STATE GoV-RNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 79 (1955).
14. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 76 (1962).
15. UNIFORM ACT FOR VOTING BY NEw RESmENTS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 71
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 1 (1962). The
major provisions of the act are:
§ 1 (Eligibility of New Residents to Vote): "Each citizen of the United States who,
immediately prior to his removal to this state, was a citizen of another state and who
has been a resident of this state for less than [insert period of required residence for
voting] prior to a presidential election is entitled to vote for presidential and vice
presidential electors at that election, but for no other offices, if (1) he otherwise
possesses the substantive qualifications to vote in this state, except the requirement of
residence [and registration], and (2) he complies with all the provisions of this act."
§ 2 (application for Presidential Ballot by New Residents): "A person desiring to
qualify under this Act ... [is not required to register but] on or before [insert last
date for registration or some other date sufficiently in advance of the election] shall
make an application in the form of an affidavit executed in duplicate in the presence
of [appropriate official] ...."
16. Six states have enacted provisions substantially similar to the Uniform Act.
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 9-163a to -163j (1964) (60 days residence in State and
town); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 34-408 to -421 (1963) (apply on or before 10 days before
election); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 3-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1963) (60 days residence
in election districit); N. Sass. LAws 1963, ch. 232, at 396; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
3-A, §§ 29-A to -0 (Supp. 1963) (apply on or before 30 days before election); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 32-1301 to .1314 (Supp. 1963). The Illinois statute differs substantially
from the Uniform Act in two ways: (1) it has incorporated the cumbersome Wisconsin
requirement that the applicant either have been a qualified voter in his state of prior
residence or that he would have been had he remained there and, (2) a person who
has made an intrastate change of residence and who has not qualified under the
general residence requirements (90 days in the county) will be permitted to vote for
the presidential and vice presidential electors if he qualifies under this act (60 days in
the election district).
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allowed to vote, if otherwise qualified, provided they apply for a
ballot within a specified number of days prior to the election. The
application for a ballot is in the form of an affidavit certifying that
the applicant has not and will not vote in any other manner. Election
officials are to be given ample time to process the application and
are required to mail a duplicate of the application to an appropriate
official of the state in which the applicant last resided. If satisfied
that the applicant is qualified to vote, the official shall deliver to
the applicant a special ballot for presidential and vice presidential
electors which is to be filled out and sealed in the election official's
presence.
The approach adopted by the Uniform Act seems to be preferable
to the Connecticut plan, and the recommended act improves the
cumbersome procedures of the Wisconsin Act. The Connecticut
approach which merely extends the absentee voting privileges ignores
the inconvenience, administrative difficulties, and the possibility of
fraud.17 The Uniform Act, unlike the Wisconsin statute, does not
require a certificate to be sent to the former state of residence for
verification of the applicant's qualifications in that state. The removal
of this cumbersome procedure is certainly desirable, and it would
seem that the provisions of the Uniform Act requiring that the elec-
tion official send a duplicate of the application to the state in which
the applicant last resided and that application for the ballot be
made a stated number of days before the election are adequate
safeguards against the possibility of fraud. At the present time,
fifteen states, including Connecticut, have adopted statutes or con-
stitutional amendments which allow new residents to vote for presi-
dential and vice presidential electors,' 8 but there has not been suffi-
cient time nor statistics since most of these states have adopted these
provisions to determine to what extent people will exercise their
voting privileges under them.19
The acts in some of the states are open to criticism because of the
inconvenience of voting under their provisions. In most states the
voter not only has to go to a central county office to make applica-
tion, but, after receiving his ballot, he must return to the same
central office to mark his ballot and sign another affidavit.20 Such
17. Hearings 38; 77 HAzv. L. REv. 575 (1964).
18. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
19. Wisconsin has had experience in three national elections where new residents
were allowed to vote for presidential electors but no state wide statistics are available.
In the 1960 election 465 new resident votes were cast under the special procedure in
Madison, Wisconsin (population 96,000). California and Ohio keep state wide statis-
tics on the votes cast under their new resident procedures, and in the 1960 election
there were 11,635 such votes cast in California and 8,648 in Ohio. Hearings 483.
20. 9C UNwoRm LAws ANN. 141 (Supp. 1963). In a large county the applicant
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inconvenience probably will not. inhibit the truly dedicated citizen;
but it will act as a barrier to many on the fringes. It would seem
that once the applicant has made application, been approved, and
received his ballot, it would be sufficient to have the ballot wit-
nessed by a notary public and then mailed to the appropriate official.
The Uniform Act is also open to criticism in that it does not spell
out the effect which it is to have on local residence requirements.
Most states have, in addition to the within-the-state residence re-
quirement, local residence requirements which vary from thirty days
to one year.21 To effectuate the purpose of the Uniform Act, these
requirements should be waived. These local residence requirements
present one additional problem. If a state adopted a new resident
voting statute with a period of required residence shorter than the
local residence requirement, a qualified voter who made an intra-
state change of residence might not be permitted to vote because
he had not satisfied the local residence requirement,2 2 while a new
resident of the state would be allowed to vote. To eliminate the dis-
crimination against intrastate change of residence, Kansas, for exam-
ple, has added a within-the-state residence requirement of forty-five
days to the Uniform Act.2 3 This period is slightly in excess of the
thirty-day local requirement and, therefore, discriminates against the
interstate mover. Where local residence requirements exist, it would
seem preferable to place the interstate and intrastate movers on an
equal basis for voting in presidential elections.
In some states, residence requirements are set forth in the state
constitution, and several of these constitutions deal specifically with
voting in presidential elections.24 However, states wishing to enact
legislation reducing the residence requirements for voting for presi-
dential electors may find that they can do so without constitutional
change. That residence requirements can be reduced by state legisla-
tive action without a constitutional amendment is based upon the
proposition that qualifications for voting in presidential elections are
governed by article II, section 1, of the federal constitution which reads
"Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature there of
may live as far as thirty miles from the designated office. Requiring two trips to the
office-one to make application and one to vote-is an inconvenience which may keep
many persons from voting.
21. Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile
Society, 61 MIcn. L. Raw. 823, 829 (1963).
22. Illinois has solved this problem by permitting intrastate movers who do not
satisfy general state residence requirements to vote for presidential electors on the same'
basis as new state residents. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 3-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1963).
See the discussion in note 15 supra.
23. Kan. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 232, at 396.
24. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1- ; Mo. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; OMo CONST, art: V, ] ;
ORE. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
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may direct, a number of electors .. ."25 Although the Supreme
Court has not ruled on this precise point, in McPherson v. Blacker 2
it was suggested in dictum that the power of state legislatures over
the method of selecting presidential electors "is plenary and cannot
be limited by state constitutions."27 Although not deciding this par-
ticular issue, recent Supreme Court decisions have cited McPherson
v. Blacker, with approval,28 and a number of state courts have taken
a similar position in upholding the validity of legislation allowing
servicemen to vote by absentee ballot 29 and legislation granting
voting rights to women 30 even though such legislation violated pro-
visions of the state constitutions. This view, however, has not gained
universal acceptance as is evidenced by one state governor's veto
of a bill extending absentee voting privileges to nonresidents on the
ground that it violated the state constitution. 31 The governor, recog-
nizing the contrary dictum of McPherson v. Blacker, concluded that
"in absence of a definitive decision.., we should not lightly assume
that the legislature can override our Constitution in this respect."
32
This view is contrary to the conclusion of the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws33 and the few writers who have considered the
problem.34 It seems safe to conclude that the choosing of presidential
electors is within the power of the state legislatures, in whatever
manner they deem proper, and that this power is not limited by state
constitutional provisions; however, the state legislatures are probably
subject to such procedural limitations as veto, referendum, and
initiative.3 Even if there is some doubt as to the constitutional limita-
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. (Emphasis added.)
26. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
27. Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections,
27 LAw & Co='rra,. PROB. 495, 500 (1962). Professor Kirby, formerly Chief Counsel
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, examines state consti-
tutional limitations and concludes that these provisions have no limiting authority over
the state legislatures' power to prescribe lesser requirements for those voting for presi-
dential electors. See also, Lugg, State Legislatures' Authority Over the Selection of
Presidential Electors, 37 CoNN. B.J. 7 (1963).
28. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1958); Ray v. Blair,
343 U.S. -214, 223 (1952); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 568 (1946).
29.-Commonwealtl ex rel. Dummitt v. O'Connell, 298 Ky. 44, 181 S.W.2d 691
(1944); Opinion of the Justices, 80 N.H. 595, 113 Atl. 293 (1921); Opinion of the
justices, 45 N.H. 595 (1864); Opinion of the Justices, 37 Vt. 665 (1864). But see
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
.30. Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 Ill. 305, 106 N.E. 276 (1914).
31. Message of Governor Robert B. Meyner to the General Assembly of New
Jersey Accompanying Assembly Bill No. 684, December 19, 1960.
32. Ibid.
33.. 9C UNiFonM LAws ANN. 135, 137 (Supp. 1963).
34. Kirby, supra note 27; Lugg, supra note 27.
35. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932) (under article I, section 4, the legislatures'
power is subject' to the governor's veto). In Commonwealth ex rel. Dummitt v.
O'Connell, note 29 supra, the court interpreted Smiley v. Holm as meaning only that
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tions, this should not deter state legislatures from acting. As one
writer has pointed out,3 both the Uniform Act and the Connecticut
method contemplate the use of a special ballot which could easily
be separated from the regular ballots in the event that such statutes
should be declared unconstitutional. In adopting such legislation,
state legislatures should carefully examine the state's general resi-
dence requirements and make any changes necessary to put intrastate
and interstate movers on an equal basis for voting in presidential
elections. All states should adopt the Uniform Act and thereby
minimize disenfranchisement of the mobile members of our society.
a legislature must function "in the method prescribed by the State Constitution," but
that when the legislature functions in the prescribed manner, "the scope of its
enactment" is not also limited. 298 Ky. at 50, 181 S.W.2d at 694.
36. 77 HAnv. L. REv. 574, 578 (1964).
